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LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING
INTERESTS: A VIEW TOWARDS BETTER SELF-
REGULATION
Integrity is the very breath of justice. Confidence in our
law, our courts and in the administration of justice is our
supreme interest. No practice must be permitted to prevail
which invites towards the administration of justice a doubt
or distrust of its integrity.'
INTRODUCTION
The complex and intertwining relationships of modem
society have spawned an increased demand for legal represen-
tation. With this heightened demand has come a corresponding
increase in the number of situations where legal representation
involves actual or potential conflicting interests.' Ideally, an
attorney would be fully prepared for such situations, and thus
could easily withdraw from a controversy presenting conflicts
with the interests of present' or former clients.'
This ideal, however, is not day-to-day reality. All too
often, attorneys, unaware of their ethical obligations when con-
flicts arise, find themselves disqualified by the courts for at-
tempted representation of adverse interests. An untimely dis-
qualification may prove disastrous for a client who, well into
the litigation, suddenly finds himself without an attorney.
1. Erwin M. Jenning Co. v. Di Genova, 107 Conn. 491, 499, 141 A. 866, 868
(1928).
2. For the purpose of this comment, the meaning of the term conflicts of interests
shall be limited to representation of interests adverse to the interests of a present or
former client. Excluded from the discussion are situations in which the attorney him-
self has an interest adverse to his client. For an annotation on this subject, see Annot.,
20 A.L.R.2d 1280 (1951). Also see, e.g., Ames v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 3d. 910, 506 P.2d
625, 106 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1973). See also 7 AM. JuR.2d Attorneys at Law §§ 160-165
(1963).
3. For annotations on the question of simultaneous representation of adverse
interests, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 715 (1970) (disqualification of attorneys in civil
cases); Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969) (liability for negligence in an action for mal-
practice); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968) (representation subjecting an attorney to
disciplinary action); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 759 (1961) (disqualification for representa-
tion of trustees or receivers in bankruptcy).
4. For annotations on the propriety of an attorney representing interests adverse
to those of a former client, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 953 (1970) (prosecuting attorney's
prior relation with the accused); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1957) (representation of
interests adverse to those of a former client); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1307 (1927) (same).
See also Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interest: Representation of Interest Adverse to
that of Former Client, 55 B.U.L. REv. 61 (1975).
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Since the avoidance of conflicts is within the attorney's control,
disqualification adversely affecting a current client presents
potential malpractice liability.5
Representation of adverse interests is but one of a growing
number of disciplinary violations that plague the State Bar of
California. Attorneys, by engaging in minimal self-regulation,
can avoid most of these problems. Representation of adverse
interests can result in more than embarassment to the individ-
ual attorney. It serves to further shake public confidence in the
already tarnished legal community.6
As a recurring problem, representation of adverse interests
can be attributed to a number of factors. To begin with, many
attorneys lack an adequate education in legal ethics.7 In addi-
tion, most attorneys give the readily available codes of ethical
conduct little more than cursory attention. Finally, the very
structure of the codes is at fault. As written, the ethical codes,
couched in policy rather than practice, offer only minimum
guidance to even the most responsible and diligent attorney.,
How, then, can attorneys avoid representation of conflict-
ing interests? What are the standards of conduct and how do
they affect the daily practice of law? Can attorneys avoid judi-
cial intervention by self-regulation? The answers to these ques-
tions rest in an analysis of the conflicts problem.
The purpose of this comment is to promote better self-
regulation of adverse interests by providing attorneys with a
more through understanding of the problem and its elements.
It will accomplish this purpose by first reviewing the relevant
5. See generally Calzada v. Sinclair, 6 Cal. App. 3d 903, 86 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1970);
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
6. A recent poll measuring the levels of public confidence in professional fields
asked the following question: "How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards
of the people in the following fields: very high, high, average, low or very low?" Of those
participating, 75% rated the honesty and ethical standards of attorneys as average or
below. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1976, § 1, at 32, col. 7. See generally Enright & Quigley,
Public Awareness, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 299 (Supp. 1976).
7. Interest in the study of ethics is a recent phenomenon. Many attorneys have
received little or no training in the legal. profession. "The Directory of Law Teachers
for 1950 shows 58 teaching Legal Ethics; the Directory for 1969 shows 239 teaching
Legal Profession, 75% of these for less than 6 years." S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS, JR., &
E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (1970).
8. As an educational instrumentality the California Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct are singularly uninspiring. They intermix fundamental
tenets of ethical obligation with a turgid mass of superficial do's and
don'ts, comparable to strewing the Ten Commandments among the in-
terstices of the Internal Revenue Code.
Jeffry v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App., 3d 6, 12, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (1977).
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portions of both the American Bar Association's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and the California State Bar's Rules of
Professional Conduct, which broadly outline the attorney's
duties when conflicts arise. Following this review, the basic
elements of problems involving adverse representation will be
examined, revealing the steps an attorney must take in imple-
menting a program of self-regulation. Finally, this comment
will analyze several day-to-day examples of conflict situations,
highlighting ways in which effective self-regulation can be ac-
complished.
THE STANDARDS OF PROPRIETY
The practice of law was far from professional during the
latter part of the nineteenth century.' Unethical activities
within the legal community clearly called for a more definitive
statement of the acceptable rules of conduct.
State bar associations were the first to respond. 0 However,
these initial codifications of legal ethics varied widely in both
form and substance, failing to provide a uniform model of con-
duct upon which attorneys could pattern their actions. In 1908,
the American Bar Association (ABA) responded to the prob-
lems caused by this lack of uniformity when it adopted its
Canon of Ethics. This document became the foundation of vir-
tually all state codes governing professional responsibility and
conflicts of interests." Yet by the 1960's, the Canons had been
the subject of widespread criticism for their failure to reflect
the changing needs of the legal profession.' 2 In 1969, a new Code
of Professional Responsibility was approved by the ABA, su-
perseding the original Canons. 13
9. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 20-21 (1953).
10. Id. at 23.
11. Id. at 24-25.
12. See generally ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at v-vi (Preliminary Draft, 1969); 0. PHILLIPS &
P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 205-06 (1952); Sutton, Revision of the
Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association, 21 RECORD OF N.Y. CIY B.A. 472
(1966); Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW. 323 (1965);
Wright, An Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 21 RECORD OF N.Y. CrrT
B.A. 581 (1966); Cheatham, A Re-evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A
Symposium, 33 TENN. L. REv. 129 (1966).
13. Comment, Professional Responsibility in Client Representation-A Re-
evaluation, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 113 (1969).
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ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code)
is designed for use by state bar associations as a code of ethical
responsibility. 4 It is divided into three interrelated parts: 1)
Canons, 2) Ethical Considerations, and 3) Disciplinary Rules.
The Canons set forth axiomatic norms containing the gen-
eral standards of conduct expected of all attorneys. Ethical
Considerations are aspirational guide lines, presenting a set of
principles to which attorneys should strive. The Disciplinary
Rules provide standards of conduct which no attorney may fall
below without being subject to disciplinary action. 5 Specific
provisions in the ABA Code deal with representation of adverse
interests, setting forth the rules which control the relationship
of the attorney with his present and former clients.
Canon Four. The special fiduciary relationship between
the attorney and the client, which is violated when a conflict
of interest arises, is contained in Canon Four, which requires
that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidence and Secrets of
a Client."'" Attorneys must actively protect this relationship.
"Care should be exercised by a lawyer to prevent the dis-
closure of the confidences and secrets of one client to another,
and no employment should be accepted that might require
such disclosure."' 7 The duty to protect the attorney-client rela-
tionship extends indefinitely beyond the term of employment.'8
Representation of adverse interests subjects attorneys to
disciplinary action under the standards of Disciplinary Rule 4-
101(B). At a minumum, "a lawyer shall not knowingly: 1) Re-
veal a confidence or secret of his client. 2) Use a confidence or
secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client."' 9
14. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, preamble (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE]
15. In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 853, 505 P.2d 1369, 1375-76, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313,
320 (1973). Although the new ABA code differs from the original canons in both sub-
stance and structure (Compare the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908) with
the ABA CODE), the change emphasizes format and clarity through a new organiza-
tional framework consisting of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. See Weddington, A Fresh Approach to Preserving Independent Judg-
ment-Canon 6 of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, 11 ARIz. L. REV.
31-33 (1969).
16. For the complete text of Canon 4 concerning representation of adverse inter-
ests, see ABA CODE, Ethical Considerations [hereinafter EC] 4-1, 4-5, 4-6 and Disci-
plinary Rule [hereinafter DR] 4-101.
17. Id. EC 4-5.
18. Id. EC 4-6.
19. Id. DR 4-101(B).
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Canon Five. Canon Five establishes that "A Lawyer
Should Exercise Independent Judgment on Behalf of a
Client."20 In line with this principle the ABA Code suggests
that an attorney should endeavor to avoid conflicting interests,
as illustrated by Ethical Consideration 5-14:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment
required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continua-
tion of employment that will adversely affect his judgment
on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client.'
With respect to the attempted representation of conflict-
ing interests, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) provides the mini-
mum obligation to be fulfilled. "A lawyer shall decline prof-
fered employment if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employ-
ment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing
differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C)."22
Canon Nine. The axiomatic duty of every attorney.is con-
tained in Canon Nine which provides that "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety." 3 This moral obli-
gation is clearly spelled out in Ethical Consideration 9-6:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity
and honor of his profession . . . to conduct himself so as
to reflect on the legal profession and to inspire confidence,
respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; and to
strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also
the appearance of impropriety."
This obligation is central to any conflicts problem, since both
the client and the public are likely to doubt the loyalty of an
attorney who continues to represent a party despite having an
interest adverse to that party.
20. For the complete text of Canon 5 concerning representation of adverse inter-
ests, see id. EC 5-14-EC 5-20 and DR 5-105-DR 5-106.
21. Id. EC 5-14.
22. Id. DR 5-105(A). Id. DR 5-105(C) provides that:
[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can
adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such represen-
tation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf
of each.
23. For the complete text of Canon 9 relating to representation of adverse inter-
ests, see id. EC 9-1, EC 9-2 and EC 9-6.
24. Id. EC 9-6.
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California Rules of Professional Conduct
Although a majority of states have chosen to adopt the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility in whole or in sub-
stance,2 California has formulated a distinct body of ethical
standards governing the propriety of legal representation. 2
These standards include sections of the State Bar Act of 1927,
which regulate the operations of the State Bar, its organization,
government, membership, powers, the practice of law, and the
solicitation of legal business F
The fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship is
established by a combination of the attorney's duty to perform
to the best of his knowledge and ability" with case law stating
that the relationship is a fiduciary one of the highest charac-
ter.2' Clearly, an attorney must "maintain inviolate the confid-
ence and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his
clients." 0
In addition, the State Bar Act provides for the Rules of
Professional Conduct (California Rules) .3 These rules set forth
the minimum standards of ethical conduct for attorneys32 and,
like the ABA Code, contain a specific set of provisions regulat-
ing representation of adverse interests.
25. Janofsky, President's Message, 48 CAL.ST.B.J. 224 (1973).
26. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when adopted by the Board
and approved by the Supreme Court, are binding .upon all members of
the State Bar. For a wilful breach of any of these rules, the Board has
the power to discipline members of the State Bar by reproval, public or
private, or to recommend to the Supreme Court the suspension from
practice for a period not exceeding three years of members of the State
Bar.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6077 (Deering 1976).
27. Id. §§ 6000-6190.6.
28. Every person on his admission shall take an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
California, and faithfully to discharge the duties of any attorney at law
to the best of his knowledge and ability. A certificate of the oath shall be
indorsed upon his license.
Id. § 6067.
29. See, e.g., Cutler v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 241, 455 P.2d 108, 78 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1969).
30. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (Deering 1976).
31. "With the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board of Governors may
formulate and enforce rules of professional conduct for all members of the bar in the
State." Id. § 6076.
32. It is well established that the California rules set minimum standards of
conduct and are not expressions of aspirational goals. Each rule requires strict adher-
ence to its principle. See, e.g., Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 603, 510 P.2d 719, 108
Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973).
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Rule 4-101 encompasses the acceptance of employment
adverse to the interests of a client or former client. It provides
that:
A member of the State Bar shall not accept employment
adverse to a client or former client without the informed
and written consent of the client or former client relating
to a matter in reference to which he has obtained
confidential information by reason of or in the course of his
employment by such client or former client. 31
Rule 5-102 sets forth the factors to be considered in avoid-
ing conflicting interests. It provides that:
a) A member of the State Bar shall not accept profes-
sional employment without first disclosing his relation, if
any, with the adverse party, and his interest, if any, in the
substantive matter of the employment. A member of the
State Bar who accepts employment under this rule shall
first obtain the client's written consent to such employ-
ment;
b) A member of the State Bar shall not represent con-
flicting interests, except with the written consent of all
parties concerned .3'
Although there are variations in both the substance and
the application of the California and ABA codes, it is quite
clear that their purpose is singular. The attorney-client rela-
tionship imposes a duty of undivided loyalty upon attorneys,
making it improper to assume a position inconsistent with the
interests of a present or former client without complete disclo-
sure and the informed consent of all parties involved.
In California, however, only the Rules of Professional Con-
duct have obtained legal status by approval of the California
Supreme Court.35 The ABA Code, once noted by the California
Rules in connection with conduct outside their scope, is no
longer mentioned in their text.36 Nevertheless, the California
33. Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE foll. § 6076, Rule 4-101 (West Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Rules
of Professional Conduct] (emphasis added).
34. Id. 5-102 (emphasis added).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6077 (Deering 1976).
36. The professional duties and responsibilities of attorneys have been governed
by the California rules since 1928. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, 204 Cal.
xci (1928). The California Rules originally commended, then subsequently noted the
ABA Code in connection with conduct not specifically mentioned in their text.
Noting the 1969 revision of the ABA Code, the Board of Governors of the State
Bar decided to revise the California Rules of Professional Conduct. This revision incor-
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judiciary continues to cite the ABA Code, and its value, espe-
cially in areas untouched by their courts, remains significant.37
While codifications of legal ethics define the parameters of
adverse representation, no general statement of professional
responsibility can hope to encompass the multitude of situa-
tions in which the problem can arise. A more thorough under-
standing of the standards of acceptable conduct requires a
closer examination of the elements comprising adverse repre-
sentation as expounded by the courts.
ADVERSE REPRESENTATION: THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The principles outlined in the foregoing ethical codes have
provided the backdrop for judicial analysis of a conflicts prob-
lem. They provide a definite set of standards which establishes
the propriety of the disputed representation. Thus, whether or
not a conflict is present which will bar an attorney from repre-
senting a given client depends on the existence or nonexistence
of the particular factors emphasized in the codes. Based on the
factors focused on by the codes and applied by the courts, the
analysis of a problem involving adverse representation is best
divided into five parts: 1) fiduciary duty, 2) good faith, 3)
attorney-client relationship, 4) adversity of interests and 5)
consent. A working knowledge of these standards will aid attor-
neys in self-regulation of conflicting interests.
Fiduciary Duty
The fundamental ethical principle violated by a conflict of
interest is the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes his client.
This special relationship requires an attorney to protect the
confidences of his present or former clients and avoid employ-
ment where he might be tempted to disclose them or use them
to his advantage. An early California court described the rela-
tionship:
[Olne of the principal obligations which bind an attorney
is that of fidelity, the maintaining inviolate the confidence
porated a number of principles from the ABA Code and adopted a new numbering
system. See Janofsky, supra note 25, at 225. The new California Rules of Professional
Conduct, approved by the California Supreme Court in 1974, no longer mention the
ABA Code in its text. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1-100 to 8-101.
37. See Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr.
9 (1978); In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973).
[Vol. 181004
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reposed in him by those who employ him, and at every
peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client.'
Frequently, courts have relied on this fiduciary duty to
disqualify attorneys for representation of interests adverse to
the interests of a present client .3 In McClure v. Donovan,0 the
marriage of D to C, an alleged incompetent, was annulled and
a guardian appointed for C. On appeal, the attorneys repre-
senting D in the annullment suit were the same attorneys rep-
resenting C on an appeal from the order appointing a guardian.
The court held representation improper on the grounds of con-
flicting interests, since a reversal of the guardianship order
would be to the benefit of D in her appeal of the annullment.
Both actions were subsequently dismissed.
The termination of an attorney's employment does end the
fiduciary responsibilities created by the previous attorney-
client relationship.' Attorneys are forever bound to protect the
trust and confidence reposed in them by a client. Thus, counsel
cannot undertake employment adverse to the interests of a
former client.2
38. Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 789 (1930).
39. Disqualification for representation of interests adverse to the interests of a
present client arise in many contexts including most commonly, husband and wife in
matrimonial proceedings, different interests in the same property or estate, debtor and
creditor, seller and purchaser, insurer and insured and the accused and prosecuting
witness. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968).
For actions involving disqualification of an attorney for dual representation, see
Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist., 143 Cal. App. 2d 715, 300 P.2d 78 (1956);
McClure v. Donovan, 82 Cal. App. 2d 664, 186 P.2d 718 (1947); Elberta Oil Co. v.
Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P. 668 (1930).
40. 82 Cal. App. 2d 664, 186 P.2d 718 (1947). The California Court of Appeal
elaborated on the fiduciary duty:
An attorney has a constant and perpetual rendezvous with ethics. He
stands as a trustee for his client's interests- a most sacred and confiden-
tial relationship. It is elementary that a conflict of interest between a
trustee and his beneficiary is never permissible. As a trustee cannot
maintain an attitude adverse to his beneficiary, so an attorney may not
represent claims inconsistent with those of his client or conflicting claims
of two clients. He cannot serve two masters.
Id. at 666, 186 P.2d at 119.
41. See ABA CODE EC 4-6 (1975) and Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
4-101.
42. For dismissal of an attorney for representation of a client whose interests are
adverse to those of a former client, see Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court,
269 Cal. App. 2d 919, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1969); Earl Scheib, Inc. v. Superior Court,
253 Cal. App. 2d 703, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1967); Grove v. Grove Valve & Reg. Co., 213
Cal. App. 2d 646, 29 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963); Galbraith v. State Bar of Cal., 218 Cal.
329, 23 P.2d 291 (1933); Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505
(1932).
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In Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey,4" an attorney em-
ployed by Wutchumna for a number of years was disqualified
from representing adverse claimants to a group of water rights
claimed by that company. During the term of his employment
with Wutchumna, the attorney had acquired free access to the
water company's rights, titles, and confidential information.
The court found a continuing fiduciary duty between attorney
and client, making such representation improper.
In summary, then it is the fiduciary nature of the attorney-
client relationship that makes representation of adverse inter-
ests improper. Attorneys must preserve the confidential infor-
mation entrusted in them. They are bound by an obligation of
undivided loyalty to each client. Representation of conflicting
interests would prevent fulfillment of this duty.
Good Faith
Representation of adverse interests is improper despite the
honesty and good intentions of an attorney. Good faith, a valid
defense in many areas of the law, is no defense to a breach of
the attorney-client confidence. The rationale underlying this
rule is a matter of public policy."
The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to pre-
clude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a
position where he may be required to choose between con-
flicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflict-
ing interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the
rights of the interest which he should alone represent. 5
From the standpoint of convenience, honest but misguided
attorneys commonly believe it not only feasible, but desirable
to engage in dual representation. Any problem relating to the
conflict of interest that exists or may potentially exist is simply
viewed as one that the attorney can manage.
However, sentiments among clients change often render-
ing effective advocacy in these situations impossible. In re-
sponse to this problem, the courts have ruled out any defense
based on good faith. This effectively discourages any represen-
43. 216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505 (1932).
44. The fact that attorneys may be disqualified for representation of adverse
interests, regardless of good faith, is well established in California. See Hammett v.
McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952); Sheffield v. State Bar of Cal., 22
Cal. 2d 627, 140 P.2d 376 (1943) (by implication); Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey,
216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505 (1932).
45. Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 789 (1930).
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tation of adverse interests in the absence of the informed con-
sent of all parties who might be injured thereby." Strict con-
struction of the rule prohibiting representation of adverse inter-
ests, however, would be too inflexible for the controversies con-
fronting the courts today. As such, the courts have imposed
several limitations on the general rule. Representation of con-
flicting interests is proper:
1). Where the attorney-client relationship was never
truly created, or
2). Where the new representation is not in fact adverse
to the interests of the present or former client, or
3). Where the parties consent to the adverse representa-
tion. 7
Each of these limitations warrant closer attention.
The Attorney-Client Relationship
The rule barring representation of adverse interests is
applicable only where an attorney-client relationship was in
fact created. 8 Whether or not the relationship exists is a ques-
tion of law. 9 Moreover, a factual conflict about the evidence
underlying the creation of the relationship, must be resolved by
the trial court °
An attorney-client relationship is created by a certain
threshold level of representation. For example, in Hicks v.
Drew,51 the plaintiff held several conversations with attorney A
concerning an injury to real property. A's offer to litigate upon
a contingency fee was rejected by the plaintiff, who subse-
quently hired another attorney. The defendants in the same
action then hired A over the plaintiff's objections. Representa-
tion was held to be proper. In explaining its decision, the court
46. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-102.
47. See, e.g., Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d 919,
927, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580, 585 (1969).
48. The rule prohibiting representation of adverse interests does not apply absent
a true attorney-client relationship. Where there is no fiduciary obligation and no confi-
dential information to protect, there is no duty to protect the complaining party. See,
e.g., Kraus v. Davis, 6 Cal. App. 3d 484, 85 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1970).
49. The determination of [the existence of the attorney-client rela-
tionship] is one of law [citation omitted]. However, where there is a
conflict in the evidence the factual basis for determination must first be
determined, and it is for the trial court to evaluate the evidence.
Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 287, 301 P.2d 10, 11 (1956).
50. Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956).
51. 117 Cal. 305, 49 P. 189 (1897).
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reasoned that since the conversations between the parties con-
cerned the fee and not confidential information, no attorney-
client relationship had been formed.
Other cases reflect a similar focus, requiring, at a mini-
mum, circumstances under which information might have
been exchanged in confidence. Thus, one court concluded that
the relationship of attorney and client did not arise where the
attorney acted only as a scrivener, absent more evidence of a
confidential relationship. 2 A later court held that an attorney-
client relationship was not created by dealings between corpo-
rate counsel and a corporate officer, even though the officer's
personal interests were coincident with the interests of the cor-
poration." Similarly, no attorney-client relationship was found
to exist between a county counsel and a county assessor. 4
Clearly, the attorney-client relationship cannot exist with-
out a transfer of confidential information between the parties
concerned. In addition, there must be some expectation of such
a relationship by the client, although it seems evident that no
express retainer need exist. 5
However, the precise level of representation that creates
an attorney-client relationship remains uncertain. Determina-
tion of the issue must be made on a case by case basis. The
prudent attorney is well advised to avoid any employment
where adverse representation might become an issue. While the
lack of an attorney-client relationship is a complete defense to
an assertion of conflicting interests, it must be remembered
that the establishment of this defense is not always success-
ful.56
Since the existence of an attorney-client relationship in
situations involving only two parties is quite unclear, the addi-
tion of a third party renders the problem all the more difficult.
Courts have remedied the situation by formulating what is best
termed an "imputation of knowledge theory."57
52. Towns v. Towns, 36 Cal. App. 2d 88, 96 P.2d 971 (1939).
53. Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956).
54. Ward v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. App. 3d 23, 138 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1977).
55. See Farnham v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 605, 612, 552 P.2d 445, 131 Cal. Rptr.
661 (1976); Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal. 3d 603, 510 P.2d 719, 108 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1973);
Arden v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 310, 341 P.2d 6 (1959).
56. See, e.g. Emile Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. See Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); NCK
Org'n Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Yarn Processing Patent
Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976); Cinerama 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,
528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
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The imputation of knowledge theory operates on the pre-
sumption that confidential information is freely exchanged
within law firms. Thus, knowledge and information acquired
by one attorney in representing a client is imputed to every
other attorney in that firm. This "artificial" attorney-client
relationship between the firm's attorneys and the client pre-
cludes any such attorney from assuming a position adverse to
that client.5"
This principle is illustrated in Schloetter v. Railoc of Indi-
ana, Inc.5" There, plaintiff moved to disqualify defendant's
counsel in an action for patent infringement. It was contended
that attorney A, who had once represented plaintiff in a related
matter, had passed relevant confidential information to firm
X, now representing the defendant, before leaving that employ-
ment. The court held representation improper under the impu-
tation of knowledge theory. The court felt it was irrelevant that
attorney A no longer worked for firm X, because the mere ap-
pearance of impropriety must be avoided. The court stated:
"[a] client should not fear that confidences conveyed to his
attorney in one action will return to haunt him in a later one."' 0
However, the imputation of knowledge theory could result
in broad disqualifications, many of them beyond the ethical
code's original purpose. The courts have dealt with this threat
by limiting the scope of the ethical commands.
For example, attorneys often begin their careers as asso-
ciates or clerks in large law firms. The courts have generally
concluded that such employment does not preclude associates
from undertaking subsequent representation adverse to clients
of their former firm as long as "no substantial relationship
existed between the pending litigation and the matters upon
which he [the attorney] had worked for the client during his
prior association.""1
Similarly, the courts have rejected the notion that confi-
dential information imputed to one firm by an entering asso-
58. Laskey Bros. of W. Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). But see In re Charles L., 63 Cal. App. 3d
760, 764, 132 Cal. Rptr. 840, (1976). See also cases cited note 57 supra.
59. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 711, quoting Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384
(3d Cir. 1972).
61. Gas-A-Tron of Ariz. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). See also Silver Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Kraus v. Davis, 6 Cal. App. 3d
484, 85 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1970).
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ciate or partner can be imputed to another firm by a separate
attorney in that firm." Suppose that attorney A of firm X
represents client C. Attorney J of firm X, who did not partici-
pate in the representation of C, leaves firm X and goes to firm
Y. Under the imputation of knowledge theory discussed above,
J cannot represent an interest adverse to C even though he has
left firm X.
This imputation theory could be extended to impute the
receipt of confidential information, already imputed to J, to
attorney D of firm Y. If this rule were followed, neither D nor
any attorney in firm Y could represent interests adverse to C.
This so called "double imputation" theory is clearly beyond
public policy since it would invent conflicts where none exist
and would seriously hinder the mobility of attorneys between
firms. 3
Under the imputation of knowledge rule, then, courts pre-
sume that confidential information has been transferred be-
tween parties. The cases limiting the application of this rule
shift the burden of proof back to the plaintiff, who must show
that such a transfer actually took place, thus balancing the
individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel with the
need to maintain high ethical standards of professional respon-
sibility.
Adverse Interests
As previously discussed, the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship precludes the representation of adverse interests.
Two principles underlie this proposition:
1). The client's secrets and confidences must be main-
tained, and
2). The attorney cannot act adversely to a client in a
controversy in which he has worked.6'
Legal representation violating these principles is improper.
Consequently, the question arises: When is representation
truly adverse?
Clearly, in the absence of informed consent, an attorney
62. NCK Org'n Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976); American Can Co.
v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. See cases cited note 62 supra. However, under these facts if J and D ex-
changed any confidential information concerning C, D should withdraw from any
subsequent representation adverse to C. Id.
64. Galbraith v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 329, 332, 23 P.2d 291, 292 (1933) (by implica-
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may not represent the simultaneously conflicting claims of two
or more clients in the same controversy where the confidential
information of one is or may be used against the other."
However, a grey area exists where counsel undertakes the
simultaneous representation of two clients in different contro-
versies, who have antagonistic but not directly adverse inter-
ests. In this situation, the confidential information obtained
from one client is generally not directly related to the action
involving the other party. In at least one case, the view has
been taken that such representation is improper.
In Jeffrey v. Pounds," an action was brought by a law firm
to recover compensation for services performed in a personal
injury suit instituted by P. In defense, P maintained that his
liability to pay terminated when the same firm undertook rep-
resentation of P's wife in a dissolution of marriage action. On
the consent issue, the court held representation improper under
California Rule 5-102(B). In broad dicta, the court found that
rule 5-102(B) extends not only to representation of adverse in-
terests in a single controversy but also "to situations where
antagonism pervades the client's relationship, stimulating the
first client to doubt his attorney's loyalty when the latter ac-
cepts unrelated but antagonistic employment." 7
Despite its appearance in dicta, the rule in Jeffrey should
not be overlooked since it is firmly grounded in the ethical
codes. Both the California Rules and the ABA Code require
that an attorney maintain undivided loyalty to his client until
their relationship is terminated, and in some cases beyond ter-
mination." The ethical pronouncements logically dictate that
an attorney should not accept employment that will compro-
mise his judgment and divide his loyalties with respect to sev-
eral clients. Thus, Jeffrey should be read to erect a flat bar to
suing or entertaining to sue a current client even on a matter
unrelated to the subject of that client's representation, in the
absence of consent from all parties concerned. The policy un-
65. See note 39 supra; see also Kagel v. First Commonwealth Co., 534 F.2d 194
(9th Cir. 1976); American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d
579, 113 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1974); Kraus v. Davis, 6 Cal. App. 3d 484, 85 Cal. Rptr. 846
(1970); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Grove v.
Grove Value & Regulator Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 646, 20 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963).
66. 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1977); see also Cinerama 5, Ltd. v.
Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
68. See ABA CODE EC 4-5, EC 4-6, DR 4-101(B), EC 5-1, EC 5-14 and Cal. Rules
of Profssional Conduct, Rule 4-101.
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derlying this rule extends beyond contemplated litigation to
the assumption of any relation adverse to a current client."
Representation of interests adverse to the interests of a
former client is proper if the representation is not, in fact,
adverse.70 The requisite degree of adversity is found "not
merely when the attorney will be called upon to use confiden-
tial information obtained in the course of the former employ-
ment, but in every case when, by reason of such subsequent
employment, he may be called upon to use such confidential
information."' Quite clearly, injury to the complainant is not
an essential element of adversity.
In Pepper v. Superior Court,12 counsel bringing suit as ex-
ecutor following the death of the original plaintiff was both a
member of the defendant country club and a person who would
benefit if his suit against the club was successful. The country
club moved to disqualify the attorney for representation of ad-
verse interests. The court held the representation proper. No
evidence was presented indicating the attorney acquired confi-
dential information from the country club in a previous
attorney-client relationship. In fact, there was no evidence that
any such relationship ever existed.
It is clear then that attorneys may not represent interests
adverse to either present or former clients when confidential
information concerning that controversy has been aquired in
the prior relationship. Use of that information or injury to the
complaining party is unnecessary. The mere possession of con-
fidential information raises a presumption that such relation-
ships are both improper and adverse.7"
69. By virtue of this rule [undivided loyalty] an attorney is pre-
cluded from assuming any relation which would prevent him from devot-
ing his entire energies to his client's interests. Nor does it matter that the
intention and motives of the attorney are honest. The rule is designed not
alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a
position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties
or he be led to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to
their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent.
Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 193 P. 788, 789 (1930).
70. See note 42 supra.
71. Galbraith v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 329, 332-33, 23 P.2d 291, 292 (1933). Also,
see Sheffield v. State Bar, 22 Cal. 2d 627, 140 P.2d 376 (1943); Wutchuma Water Co.
v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 15 P.2d 505 (1932); Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior
Court, 269 Cal App. 2d 919, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1969); Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 24, 32 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1963).
72. 76 Cal. App. 3d 252, 142 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1977).
73. The rules protect the confidences reposed in the attorney for two basic rea-
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Consent
As a general rule, representation of adverse interests is
permissible when there is full disclosure and informed consent
of all parties to the controversy.7" Absent such consent, "the
duty of loyalty to different clients renders it impossible for an
attorney, consistent with ethics and the fidelity owed to clients,
to advise one client as to the disputed claim against the
other. '5
Prior to the revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct
in 1975,76 a number of cases held representation of adverse
interests proper upon oral consent." Some courts went so far
as to approve a tacit waiver of the right to object to such repre-
sentation."
The revision, however, changed the pattern of common law
significantly. At present, consent to representation of adverse
interests can be effectuated only by the written consent of all
parties to the controversy.7 Similarly, it seems apparent that
a party, who has not consented to the adverse representation,
cannot inadvertently waive his right to object to such represen-
tation. 0
In addition, consent must be both informed and intelligent
and given upon full disclosure of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the subject matter of litigation. " Some threshold
sons: (1) to insure fundamental fairness in litigation, and (2) to foster an atmosphere
of openness to encourage a client to freely disclose information, knowing it will not
come back to haunt him. See NCK Org'n Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976);
Emile Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l. Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3rd Cir. 1972).
74. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-102.
75. Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512
(1977).
76. See note 36 supra.
77. See, e.g., Lessing v. Gibbons, 6 Cal. App. 2d 598, 45 P.2d 258 (1935).
78. See, e.g., Croce v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 2d 18, 68 P.2d 369 (1937).
79. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 4-102 and 5-102.
80. Since the courts seek to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in the
administration of justice, undue delay even with full knowledge of the conflicts will
not bar a party's right to bring a motion of action to disqualify an attorney representing
conflicting interests. See, e.g., Emile Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d
Cir. 1973); Koehring Co. v. Manitowoc Co., 418 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Wisc. 1976).
Alternatively, the party is not deemed to have waived the right to move to disqual-
ify an attorney merely because the tasks performed by the attorney could have been
accomplished by a layman or the information reposed in the attorney has become a
matter of public knowledge. The rationale for this view is that the lawyer has an ethical
obligation, which is broader than the attorney-client privilege, to guard the confidences
of his client, without regard to the type of services performed, or the nature and source
of information obtained. See NCK Org'n Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976);
Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
81. In either the current or former client setting, an attorney who undertakes to
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level of-consent must be met. Determination of this issue is left
to the individual attorney, although the matter is clearly sub-
ject to judicial approval.
Initially, the trial court is entitled to accept properly exe-
cuted written consents to joint representation at their face
value. The judge is entitled to presume the attorney is
familiar with the law and code of professional ethics and
has complied with the proper standards. However, if the
judge has any question regarding whether the proper stan-
dards have been observed, it is his duty to either require
counsel to inquire further or inquire himself regarding the
circumstances of the execution of the written consents and
the state of mind of the clients for the purpose of making
the necessary factual determination in this regard.2
Several aspects of the consent issue remain unresolved
despite the standards set forth in the codes. First, consent may
not be adequate in every case, though it is informed and ob-
tained after full disclosure. At present, no cases sanction repre-
sentation of adverse interests in conjunction with a trial or
hearing despite consent of the concerned parties. It is doubtful
that "true" informed consent could be procured under such
circumstances. The court addressed this problem in Klemm v.
Superior Court:
As a matter of law a purported consent to dual representa-
tion of litigants with adverse interests at a contested hear-
ing would neither be intelligent nor informed. Such repre-
sentation would be per se inconsistent with the adversary
position of an attorney in litigation, and common sense
dictates that it would be unthinkable to permit an attor-
ney to assume a position at a trial or hearing where he
could not adovcate the interest of one client without ad-
versely injuring those of the other.s3
Secondly, there exists an unusual application of consent in
Croce v. Superior Court."4 There, an attorney who had repre-
sented several clients in an action involving a common interest
represent conflicting interests must disclose: "[AJII facts and circumstances which,
in the judgment of an attorney of ordinary skill and capacity, are necessary to enable
his client to make free and intelligent decisions regarding the subject matter of the
representation." Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414
(1968).
82. Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 893, 901, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 514
(1977).
83. Id. at 898, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (emphasis added).
84. 21 Cal. App. 2d 18, 68 P.2d 369 (1937).
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subsequently undertook representation of one of those clients
against the others in a related matter. The court held represen-
tation proper, reasoning that there had been a waiver of the
attorney-client evidentiary privilege by employing a joint at-
torney, making the subsequent representation proper by im-
plied consent. 5
The holding in Croce has been widely criticized. The evi-
dentiary privilege relied upon is much narrower than the obli-
gation to avoid representation of adverse interests set forth in
the relationship between attorney and client. 6 The court ad-
dressed this problem again in Industrial Indemity Co. v. Great
American Insurance Co.,87 reasoning that "even if Croce is still
good law, it does not apply to a situation where the joint repre-
sentation of two or more clients with conflicting interests was
undertaken or continued without disclosure and written con-
sent." In so holding, the court brought Croce in conformity
with the present standards that consent be both written and
informed.
Finally, the propriety of representing adverse interests in
the area of family law despite consent remains unsettled. In
Arden v. State Bar,"8 an attorney undertook representation of
both an unmarried woman seeking adoption of her child and a
couple who actually adopted the child. In connection with the
consent issue, the court commented:
It is suggested that the mere representation of both parties
to an adoption, even with consent, may constitute a viola-
tion of the rules of professional conduct. On this issue the
members of the Bar have expressed opposite views. In a
handbook published in 1956 by the Continuing Education
of the Bar entitled "Family Law for California Lawyers"
it was urged that dual representation was permissable. In
the State Bar Journal of July-August 1957 (32 State Bar
Journal 343) opinions to the contrary were published. The
issue is a highly debatable one. No clear-cut rule on the
subject has been announced. It is not proper to discipline
85. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
86. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 529, 536 n.5,
140 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 n.5 (1977).
87. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 529, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 806 (1977).
88. Id. at 538, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 811. See also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F.Supp. 371, 393 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
89. 52 Cal. 2d 310, 341 P.2d 6 (1959).
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an attorney for a violation of a claimed principle that was
and is so highly debatable. 0
Despite the language in Arden, the issue remains unre-
solved. The highly volatile nature of family law and the tend-
ency of the courts to favor disqualification in cases involving
even the appearance of impropriety have kept the controversy
alive."
The foregoing elemental approach to the conflict of inter-
est problem makes clear that as a fiduciary, an attorney owes
a duty of undivided loyalty to his client, a duty jealously
guarded by the courts. Thus, the courts have firmly established
that it is improper for an attorney to act contrary to or assume
a position inconsistent with the interests of his present or for-
mer clients.
As noted earlier, the burden of avoiding conflicts falls
squarely on the attorney, who must discover if they exist and
disclose them to the parties involved in the representation.
Once the actual conflicts are disclosed, the attorney must gen-
erally obtain the informed, written consent of his client and
frequently his opponent in order to continue with the represen-
tation." Without disclosure to and the consent of all parties,
an attorney may later be disqualified when the conflicts are
discovered. This comment now turns to an examination of how
an attorney might best confront common conflict situations,
avoiding the unpleasant consequences attendant upon disqual-
ification.
PREPARATION FOR AND PREVENTION OF ADVERSE REPRESENTATION
Before the Agreement to Represent
Conflicting interests are most effectively eliminated at the
initial stage of the attorney-client relationship. Early discovery
of adverse interests will help accomodate the interests of all
parties. In connection with this end, the attorney's most effec-
tive tool is the initial interview and preliminary investigation
prior to the agreement to represent. 3
90. Id. at 319, 341 P.2d at 11.
91. But see Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509
(1977) (sanctioning representation with consent in a family setting outside of litiga-
tion).
92. Compare Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-101, with id., Rule 5-
102.
93. CAL. C.E.B., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 1.3-1.4 (1977).
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The initial interview provides an attorney with basic infor-
mation about the client and his claim. Beyond the legal mat-
ters at issue, the attorney should devote a portion of this inter-
view to an investigation of potential conflicting interests. The
attorney should probe for any possible connection he might
have with the client's adversary that could present the appear-
ance of impropriety. These connections might cover existing
transactions with or prior to current representation of the ad-
verse party. Similarly, collateral relationships should not be
ignored, as they often reveal potential adverse interests. Basi-
cally, an attorney should feel free to express concern about
adverse representation. In so doing, he can inspire client con-
fidence in the fairness of the legal system.
Frequently the initial interview will be insufficent for dis-
cerning conflicting interests. Additional investigation, in ad-
vance of an agreement to represent, may be required to clarify
issues or confirm suspicions raised at the initial interview.
In particular, attorneys should search their list of present
or former clients for potential conflicts before entering the
agreement to represent. Such an investigation is crucial, espe-
cially in large law firms where disqualification is often prem-
ised upon the imputation of knowledge theory. 4 Attorneys in
large firms rarely know the identities and subject matter of all
the firm's litigation. Obviously, they know even less about the
firm's prior representation. Thus, it is recommended that these
firms maintain a system of reference allowing attorneys access
to the identities of former clients, while circulating lists of pres-
ent representation among associates at regular intervals.
It cannot be over emphasized that in seeking to avoid con-
flicts problems, there is no substitute for careful pre-
representation investigation based on a command of the appli-
cable ethical rules. Only after such an investigation can a
sound agreement to represent be formed.
The Agreement to Represent
The attorney-client fiduciary relationship officially begins
with an agreement to represent. 5 Attorneys must deal with
conflicts of interests at this stage of representation if the prob-
94. See notes 57 through 63 and accompanying text supra.
95. A formal contract or retainer is not a prerequisite to an attorney-client rela-
tionship. Often an association is formed on much less. See Farnham v. State Bar, 17
Cal. 3d 605, 131 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1976); Abeles v. State Bar, 9 Cal 3d 603, 103 Cal. Rptr.
359 (1973); Arden v. State liar, 52 Cal. 2d 310, 341 P.2d 6 (1959).
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lem of disqualification is to be avoided. Before trial, adverse
representation takes two forms: (1) potential conflicts of inter-
ests and (2) actual conflicts of interests. For either, prepara-
tion must be made.
Potential conflicting interests before trial commonly arise
in dual representation situations, where attorneys agree to rep-
resent, for example, a guardian and a minor, an executor and
an heir, a corporation and its stockholders or all the parties to
a partnership. Attorneys must be made aware that interests
presently consistent may later diverge. As a result, it will often
be wise to decline such employment and encourage the parties
to seek separate representation.
However, a decision to undertake such representation is
proper, provided that it is preceded by full disclosure of the
facts to the parties affected, so they might give effective in-
formed consent to the representation." Such consent should be
written and attached to the contract of employment.
In addition, the retainer or contract of employment should
contain an attorney's right to withdraw without prejudice upon
the manifestation of adverse interests. The provision places a
client on notice of the right to withdraw should continued em-
ployment violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. 7 This
would facilitate withdrawal, although an attorney still would
be required to give notice to his client and file a notice of
motion for an order to withdraw.
Actual conflicts before trial require greater caution on the
part of attorneys. Without consent, such representation is im-
proper. Attorneys must procure an informed consent, upon full
disclosure with a right to withdraw, from all parties to such a
controversy."9 It would be prudent, however, to decline such
representation when actual conflicts of interests involve mat-
ters of family law.9
The Consequences of Adverse Representation
Failure to perform the obligations required by the codes
exposes an attorney to severe consequences. Willfull violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct can subject the offending
party to the State Bar disciplinary process. 00 This process may
96. See notes 74 through 91 and accompanying text supra.
97. See Cal. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 2-111(C)(1)(c).
98. See notes 94 through'99 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 89 through 91 and accompanying text supra.
100. A new disciplinary process was adopted by the State Bar in 1976. While the
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lead to admonition, reproval, suspension, or in the case of a
State Bar Act violation, even disbarment.
A more immediate consequence, however, often occurs in
the courts. A party can continue to object to adverse represen-
tation at any time prior to the final judgment.'"' Thus an attor-
ney may be removed from a controversy by a motion to disqual-
ify"" or an independent action enjoining such representation 03
up to the time of final judgment.
In addition, attorneys may find it difficult to recover fees
withheld by a client who objects to adverse representation.'04
Violation of the attorney-client confidence justifies non-
payment of legal fees, even though the client has not been
harmed.
Representation of adverse interests is also grounds for an
appeal from an unfavorable judgment on the basis that the
conflicting interests denied the appellant a fair trial.'10
Finally, a controversy involving adverse interests raises a
number of legal malpractice issues. A client, unsatisfied with
the quality of representation due to a conflict of interests, could
claim negligence in both the attorney's failure to recognize the
improper arrangement and his failure to obtain the parties'
informed consent.'10 While representation of adverse interests
is to the disadvantage of all parties involved, current trends in
the judiciary clearly indicate it is the attorneys who are to bear
the burden of the consequences.
CONCLUSION
Conflicting interests can be eliminated. The goal is within
the power of attorneys, requiring little more than a competent
understanding of the codes and careful scrutiny of potential
clients. Judicial intervention is unnecessary. It is a system of
old "State Bar Procedure" was highly regarded as one of the best in the country, many
believed the procedures could be substantially streamlined. For an analysis of the new
program, see generally Ginder, The "New" Disciplinary Machinery of the State Bar,
51 CAL. ST. B.J. 193 (1976).
101. Clearly, a complainant may move for an attorney's disqualification "at any
time while the action is pending." Earl Scheib, Inc. v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App.
2d 703, 709, 61 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (1967).
102. See, e.g., Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d
919, 925, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584 (1969).
103. See, e.g., Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 574, 15 P.2d 505,
509 (1932).
104. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
105. See, e.g., Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952).
106. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
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self-regulation, and the burden to make this system work, in
the final analysis, rests upon the individual attorney.
Adherence to a simple rule will go a long way in achieving
this goal: representation should end with any indication of ad-
versity among clients. It must be remembered that attorneys
who undertake representation of conflicting interests tread the
thin ice of disciplinary action, and such conduct sorely reflects
upon the integrity of the legal profession. As a California Court
of Appeal once noted:
[A]ny gentleman going into business for himself should
be cautioned that Justice, like Caesar's wife, must be
above suspicion. She is better served by strict adherence
to her canons, but also by the avoidance of any conduct
which may be interpreted as reflecting on the integrity of
the administration of justice. 07
Marc Sangree Primiani
107. Kraus v. Davis, 6 Cal. App. 3d 484, 492, 85 Cal. Rptr. 846, 851 (1970).
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